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Note
Taking Back the Giveaways: Minnesota's Corporate
Welfare Legislation and the Search for
Accountability
Michael H. LaFave*
Mayors and governors routinely spend economic resources, time, and
effort on projects that in the end produce little in the way of new jobs
or new dollars for the community. They do so because they lack
analytical tools... to help them target their efforts. If these efforts
involve tax abatements, then the results are not simply neutral but
potentially negative. The tax revenue lost presumably must be made
up from the general tax base. This drains wealth from the community,
which is the opposite of what economic development programs are
supposed to do.'
In December 1991, the state of Minnesota offered Northwest
Airlines a financial package worth nearly $838 million as an
incentive to build two new aircraft maintenance facilities in
northern Minnesota.2 The architects of the deal maintained it
would create 1500 new jobs in the state and solidify thousands
of others.3 Although Northwest, which is hubbed in Minnesota
and employs over 17,000 state residents,4 plays an indisputably
important role in the state's economy, not everyone agreed the
* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; B-A. 1993,
University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author would like to acknowledge Kary
Moss and the staff at the Guild Law Center in Detroit for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this Note. The author's stint as an intern at the Guild Law
Center provided the inspiration for this Note.
1. EDWARD V. REGAN, GOVERNMENT, INC.: CREATING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
ECONOIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 45 (1988).
2. David Phelps, Northwest Deal Approved, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec.
17, 1991, at 1A. The package included a controversial $320 million low interest
loan to help meet operating costs, $350 million in state bonds to finance the
construction of the new maintenance bases, tax exemptions on construction
materials, and a $5000 tax credit for each new employee. Donald Barlett, NWA
Case Showed How Corporations Can Lean on Taxpayers for Bailout Help, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 1, 1994, at 14A.
3. Phelps, supra note 2, at 1A.
4. Barlett, supra note 2, at 14A.
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deal was in the state's best interest. Many, in fact, argued the
state was irresponsibly generous.' Such concerns increasingly
became credible as Northwest, which aggressively lobbied for the
package, failed to deliver on its part of the deal. By Spring
1996, the maintenance facilities, which were originally scheduled
for completion in early 1993, were still not operational and
commentators throughout the country began to herald the deal
as a classic example of "corporate welfare."'
The term "corporate welfare" connotes an image of an
undeserving recipient of public assistance and reflects increasing
dissatisfaction with the way public officials spend public
money.' Critics, in particular, have drawn attention to high
profile deals in which large sums of public money have been
used to subsidize financially stable private corporations for
projects that frequently yield very little tangible public benefit.'
5. Many criticized the state for giving away far too much without getting
any concrete commitments from Northwest. See, e.g., Dennis J. McGrath,
NWA's Letter Renews Fight on State Deal, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 29,
1992, at 1B (describing controversy surrounding the cost and nature of the
package). Others suggested that the cost of the deal grossly exceeded its
potential benefits. Id.
6. See, e.g., Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, A Costly War Between
the States, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 2, 1995, at 3B (citing Minnesota's
deal with Northwest as an example of an agreement in which a corporation
accepted a large amount of state aid without fulfilling its end of the bargain);
Charles Mahtesian, Romancing the Smokestack, GOVERNING, Nov. 1994, at 40
(citing Minnesota's agreement with Northwest as an example of a bad deal).
But see Jill Hodges, Northwest's Break from Turbulence; Employees' Stock Deal
Is Paying Off for Everyone, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 17, 1995, at 4D
(quoting officials that believe the deal "was worth it").
Northwest downgraded its commitment considerably in April, 1994. Neal
St. Anthony & Larry Oakes, Fighting for Jobs, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr.
7, 1994, at ID. Instead of two maintenance facilities employing well over 1000
people, Northwest agreed to build one maintenance facility in Duluth that
would employ 270 by the fall of 1996 and up to 350 by the year 2000. Id. The
facility is expected to open in September, 1996. 1996 Has a Crowded Agenda,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 1, 1996, at 3B.
7. The term "corporate welfare" feeds off recent negative rhetoric about
public assistance to low-income individuals. See Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing
of Public Wealth, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 153 n.21 (1995) (suggesting that
the term"corporate welfare" stems from general misconceptions about the term
"welfare"). The term was born from the perception that private corporations are
undeserving recipients of public money. Id.
8. Commentators in the media and academia alike recently have expressed
outrage over wasteful and ill-advised public expenditures on undeserving
corporations. See, e.g., Mike Meyers, Government Subsidies for Private
Businesses Ought to Be Stopped, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 1, 1995, at 2D
(positing that "[plublic subsidies to private enterprises are a bust"). One
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Amid such concern, many states have begun to rethink the
mechanisms and processes under which they dole out public
money. In April 1995, Minnesota joined a growing group of
states that are demanding accountability from private recipients
of public money by passing "corporate welfare" legislation. 0
Minnesota's legislation demands that recipients of public aid add
new jobs to the state within two years of receiving aid, and
requires those recipients who do not do so to reimburse the state
in full.11
It increasingly has become clear that if state and local
governments continue to grant business incentives, they will
need to include accountability measures in those deals.'2 This
commentator noted, "in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Exxon Corporation received 27
tax abatements totaling $14,372,600, while the company expected to create just
one new permanent job." Moss, supra note 7, at 108. Another pollster, after
completing a study on the public's response to various words and phrases,
commented that "corporate welfare" is third on the list of "things the public flips
out on." David E. Rosenbaum, Battle Over the Budget, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
1995, at B13.
9. See GREG LEROY, No MORE CANDY STORE: STATES AND CITIES MAKING
JOB SUBSIDIES ACCOUNTABLE 25-119 (documenting accountability initiatives in
various states and cities); William H. Carlile, States Are Closing Firms'"Candy
Store"; Laws Tighten Incentives, Seek Accountability for Subsidies, ARIz. REPB.,
July 24, 1994, at El (discussing recent efforts to introduce accountability
measures into incentive agreements).
10. Act of May 24, 1995, ch. 224, § 58, 1995 Minn. Laws 1686, 1721
(codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991 (West Supp. 1996)) (public assistance
to business; wage and job requirements). The statute reads:
A business that receives state or local government assistance for
economic development or job growth purposes must create a net
increase in jobs in Minnesota within two years of receiving the
assistance.
The government agency providing the assistance must establish
wage level and job creation goals to be met by the business receiving
the assistance. A business that fails to meet the goals must repay the
assistance to the government agency.
Each government agency must report the wage and job goals and
the results for each project in achieving those goals to the department
of trade and economic development. The department shall compile and
publish the results of the reports for the previous calendar year by
June 1 of each year. The reports of the agencies to the department and
the compilation report of the department shall be made available to the
public.
For the purpose of this section, "assistance" means a grant or loan
in excess of $25,000 or tax increment financing.
Id.
11. Id.
12. The purpose of this Note is not to reanalyze the efficacy or wisdom of
incentives per se, or to chronicle the phenomenon of corporate welfare-other
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Note analyzes the strengths and shortcomings of Minnesota's
new legislation as a model for the rest of the country. Part I
discusses the history of incentive packages, the accountability
problems associated with incentive agreements, various mea-
sures other states have used to ensure accountability, and the
accountability provisions in the Minnesota legislation. Part II
analyzes Minnesota's corporate welfare law. Although the
statute's intent is commendable, the law is flawed as an
accountability mechanism because it lacks clarity and omits
important provisions. Finally, Part III sets forth the Improved
Incentive Accountability Law, a model statute that would clarify
the law's application and mandate that governmental agencies
perform detailed cost/benefit analysis before granting incentives.
I. PUBLIC MONEY IN PRIVATE POCKETS
A. THE HISTORY, GROWTH AND PURPOSE OF FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES
The idea that the government can or should nurture private
business interests is not new or radical."l Scholars widely
acknowledge the important role economic incentives played in
the United State's economic development.' 4 The use of finan-
cial incentives in the past twenty years, however, has exploded.'"
commentators already have examined that question thoroughly. See generally
Moss, supra note 7 (discussing subsidy abuse, its implications, and policy
options). The purpose of this Note, rather, is to explore accountability
legislation from the perspective that, good or bad, states and cities already
grant these incentives.
13. Massachusetts granted what many believe to be the first business
incentive in the country's history in the seventeenth century. REGAN, supra
note 1, at 25.
14. See ROGER WILSON, COUNcIL OF STATE GOV'TS, STATE BusINESS
INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIc GROWTH: ARE THEY EFFECTIVE? 2-3 (1989) (tracing
the use of business incentives through history). In particular, incentives played
an integral role in the development of the railroads and the country's
consequent westward expansion. See Mark Taylor, A Proposal to Prohibit
Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEX. L. REV. 669, 671-73 (1994) (discussing
the important role governmental subsidies played in the development of the
railroad industry).
15. See LEROY, supra note 9, at 3 (providing a table noting, for example,
that between 1977 and 1993, the number of states using corporate income tax
exemptions increased from 21 to 36; the number of states enabling cities and
counties to lend dollars for building construction increased from 8 to 45; and the
number of states providing research and development tax exemptions increased
from 9 to 34, all in an effort to spur economic development).
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The American economy has deindustrialized, 16 and while a
select few have prospered, many Americans have seen their
standard of living decrease as opportunity and income have
polarized." In the wake of these changes, increasing numbers
of public officials have resorted to incentives as mechanisms to
spur local development. 8 By 1981, every state in the country
was using some type of tax or financial incentive to inspire
economic growth.'9 Recent years have seen not only an explo-
sion in the use and number of incentives, but also drastic
16. See generally DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Lloyd Rodwin &
Hidehiko Sazanami eds., 1989) (discussing structural shifts in the economy that
have been characterized by job loss in the industrial sector and job growth in
the service sector).
17. See, e.g., ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 196-207 (1991)
(discussing the increasing polarization in income that has resulted from
structural changes in the economy). National Labor Secretary Robert Reich
writes that "nearly everyone agrees that the trend, at least since the mid-1970s,
has been toward inequality." Id. at 197. He explains that while the rich
become richer, the poor become poorer, and more Americans have begun to
descend from middle-class status. Id. at 199. See generally WILLIAM W.
GOLDSMITH & EDWARD J. BLAKELY, SEPARATE SOCIETIES: POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY IN U.S. CITIES (1992) (describing a growing trend toward inequality
in the United States).
This trend has been particularly acute in American cities, where the
structural changes in the economy have precipitated a mass exodus of jobs,
capital, and people. See, e.g., Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms,
Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1351, 1372-75 (1993) (explaining that the
"flight of previously high-wage ... industries from U.S. cities" has left these
urban areas fighting to stem a "growing tide of poverty"). These conditions, in
large part, have driven public officials to use financial incentives as mechanisms
to inspire revitalization. Id. at 1374.
18. Roger Wilson, policy analyst for the Council of State Governments,
writes, "[tihe real explosion of business incentives, however, came as an
aftermath of the employment crisis of the 1970s and the recession of the early
1980s." WILSON, supra note 14, at 3. As states tried to relieve unemployment
and bolster revenues that eroded during the recession, their use of business
incentives to attract industrial prospects accelerated. Id. Other analysts note
that a particularly soft economy, a decrease in new job-creating projects by
Fortune 500 companies, voter frustration and dissatisfaction, and the federal
government's failure to develop a national policy have governors and mayors
"desperate to demonstrate that they are acting to create jobs." LEROY, supra
note 9, at 1-2; see also REGAN, supra note 1, at 25 (attributing the explosion of
tax-incentive packages to a period of stagflation in the late 1970s); Dreier, supra
note 17, at 1374 (positing that deteriorating economic conditions in American
cities have spawned a proliferation in incentives as a means of curbing the
trend).
19. WILSON, supra note 14, at 3. In sum, the states put nearly $20 billion
toward such purposes in 1981 alone. Id.
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escalation in their financial cost.2 °  As the 1990s dawned,
financial incentive packages worth over $150,000 for each
proposed job were not uncommon.2
Public officials view these extraordinary price tags as the
cost of providing a favorable business climate, and, inspired by
the notion that a healthy and happy business community will
spread prosperity throughout the state or region in general, they
remain willing to pay it.22 Policy makers hope state-sponsored
business incentives will create employment opportunities, expand
the state's tax base, and stimulate a healthier economy.23
Governments grant incentives in many different forms, most
of which are derivations of development bonds, low interest
loans, or tax incentives." Incentive proponents reject argu-
ments that incentives inappropriately transfer public money to
private businesses." They argue incentives, by stimulating
economic opportunity and creating jobs, are solid public invest-
20. See LEROY, supra note 9, at 2.
21. In 1993, Alabama dangled a financial package worth over $253 million
in front of Mercedes-Benz to entice the German-based automobile manufacturer
to build a 1500-worker plant in its state. Id. Similarly, Kentucky, at a price
of $350,000 per job, gave Dofasco, Inc., a Canadian steel manufacturing
company, over $140 million in financial aid in exchange for a 400-employee
mini-mill. Id.
22. See REGAN, supra note 1, at 1 (commenting that state and local
governments hope incentives ultimately will result in a stronger economy and
increased revenues).
23. WILSON, supra note 14, at 1-2. The "primary objective" of most
economic development programs is "expanding employment." ANDREw J.
AULDE, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE AND LOCAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
INCENTIVE MECHANISMS 3-4 (1980).
24. See WIlLiAM W. HAMILTON, INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVES: PUBLIC PROMOTION
OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 1-5 (1985) (describing the nature of most business
incentives). Tax-exempt bonds provide recipient businesses with advantageous
debt financing. Id. at 71. By exempting any income applied to state and local
debts from taxation, they potentially make debt profitable: "Because the tax-
exempt nature of these bonds increases the effective rate of return to lenders,
that is, bond purchasers, they can be sold at lower nominal rates of interests,
thereby providing an interest subsidy to the borrower." Id. Similarly, low-
interest loans provide recipient businesses with below-market rates and flexible
terms. Id. at 29. Favorable loan rates, otherwise unavailable on the private
market, facilitate investment and increase returns. Id.
Tax incentives, in contrast, reduce a recipient firm's effective rate of
taxation. Exemptions, deductions, credits, and abatements are all tools which
governments use to lower the amount of income, sales and use, or property
taxes a particular business owes. Id. at 117-20. State and local governments
typically target such tax incentives toward a firm's inventory or toward
particular activities, such as investment or job creation. Id. at 120.
25. WILSON, supra note 14, at 1.
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ments that "yield profitable rates of return."26 The courts, for
the most part, agree. The courts have rejected almost all
claims that business incentives violate the public purpose
requirement most states have in their constitutions.
B. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES: WORTH THE COST?
Despite their proliferation in use, many critics argue that
financial incentives are an ineffective means of encouraging
meaningful economic development, 29 and that such incentives
take valuable money away from investments in education,
infrastructure improvements, and job-training programs." In
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 649 F. Supp. 716, 728
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding there was no explicit commitment by the company to
the city of Yonkers in its incentive package); see also infra notes 44-45
(discussing the legal theories and outcomes of cases involving business
incentives).
28. Most state constitutions require the state to make all expenditures for
a public purpose. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1 (requiring that taxes "be
levied and collected for public purposes"). Hence, many taxpayers have
challenged the constitutionality of financial incentives for private businesses.
See, e.g., Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 10 (Me. 1983) (challenging a city
and state's costly subsidy agreement with a shipping company). Most courts,
however, are reluctant to second guess the determinations of legislative bodies.
E.g., id. at 18. A legislature's "arrangements must be upheld as being for a
public purpose unless it is clearly demonstrated that they are not." Id. The
court may only require that a legislative body have a "rational basis" for its
actions. Id. In at least one case, the court was more concerned with the
purpose of the activity than the effect. Id. In Minnesota, the courts have
determined that where the primary purpose of business incentives is to promote
public benefit, any benefits that accrue to private businesses are "incidental."
City of Pipestone v. Madsen, 178 N.W.2d 594, 603 (Minn. 1970). An Iowa
statute actually codifies the notion that incentives serve a public purpose; it
proclaims, "Economic development is a public purpose for which the state, a
city, or a county may provide grants, loans, guarantees, tax incentives, and
other financial assistance to or for the benefit of private persons." IOWA CODE
ANN. § 15A.1 (1994).
29. See Matthew T. Furton, Note, The Use of Penalty Clauses in Location
Incentive Agreements, 70 IND. L.J. 1009, 1015 (1995) (asserting that "[t]he
majority of academic studies condemn the practice of providing corporations
with direct financial assistance, and argue that this type of government subsidy
only encourages economic behavior that would have occurred anyway"). But see
Mary Jo Waits & Rick Heffernon, Business Incentives: How to Get What the
Public Pays for, SPECTRUM, June 22, 1994, at 34-35 (arguing that while many
incentives are irresponsible and poorly designed, properly structured business
incentives can be an effective economic development tool).
30. See WILSON, supra note 14, at 6-7; Moss, supra note 7, at 110. Such
critics borrow from commentary that posits education and training are the real
keys to economic development. See, e.g., STUART A. ROSENFELD, COMPETITIVE
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fact, most studies conclude business incentives are not an
effective way to promote employment growth."' Others have
argued further that incentives are actually detrimental because
they distort free-market competition and misallocate resources. 2
MANUFACTURING 207 (1992) (noting that education and training "lie at the heart
of competitiveness"). Furthermore, recent studies suggest education, as it
pertains to producing quality workers, and an area's infrastructure are among
the most important factors that businesses look for when locating a new plant.
WILSON, supra note 14, at 15.
Quality education, however, is not only important as a means to lure
businesses. Education is an exceptionally worthy candidate for public money
because it tends to define opportunity in today's economy. See ANTHONY
DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 86-87 (1994) (suggesting
that educational attainment plays an important role in determining economic
opportunity). Education has become a very telling indicator as income and
unemployment statistics increasingly have become linked with educational
attainment. Id.
Again, this is particularly relevant for urban communities, where public
schools tend to be grossly underfunded. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL,
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1991) (documenting the decrepit conditions in many
inner-city schools and noting the discrepancies in funding between suburban
and urban public schools). Students from urban public schools, for the most
part, will be at a competitive disadvantage in an education-oriented labor
market. Furthermore, low-quality central-city schools can negatively impact the
economic viability of an entire metropolitan area. See DOWNS, supra at 83
(commenting that the quality of central-city schools has "direct implications" for
the "economic welfare" of suburbanites).
Unfortunately, most state and city governments do not have additional
money to spend on education or infrastructure. See Dreier, supra note 17, at
1371 (discussing financial problems confronting most city governments). Most
state and local governments already are overspent. Peter Dreier, for example,
explains that "[clities, trapped by rising costs, shrinking resources, and
inexpandable borders, are now confronting fiscal calamity." Id.; see also DOWNS,
supra, at 50 (plotting expenditures against revenues for American cities).
Ideally, policy makers will distribute these limited resources to promote the
most public benefit-incentives and education are competing but related
addends in this equation.
31. One analyst concluded that the majority of studies about the effective-
ness of incentives suggest they "do not have a significant or primary effect on
state employment growth." WILSON, supra note 14, at 22. Many analysts
further note that states typically grant incentives through a process that is
filled with uncertainty, and that these states often have no idea what, if
anything, they are getting in return. Id. at 27; see also AULDE, supra note 23,
at 3 (commenting that "the only thing that is certain is that potentially massive
windfalls accrue to industry"); MICHAEL KIESCHNICK, TAXES AND GROWTH 21-22,
87 (Michael Barker ed., 1981).
32. See Taylor, supra note 14, at 679-83 (noting that by interfering with the
competitive market, governments risk allocating resources to inefficient
producers and therefore prevent markets from reaching their most efficient
levels of production).
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Businesses nonetheless have succeeded in pitting the states
against each other in unrelenting "incentive competitions."33
Even though public officials generally acknowledge that incen-
tives are not in their collective best interest, most are reluctant
to discontinue their use.' Efforts among the states to cooper-
ate have failed,35 and individual states are now hesitant to be
the only player to refrain from the incentive game. Most
officials fear they will find themselves at a competitive disadvan-
tage if their communities unilaterally discontinue using incentives. 6
33. Businesses have capitalized on this overall climate of insecurity, and,
in many instances, sought and obtained sweetheart deals merely by threatening
to locate elsewhere. WILSON, supra note 14, at 23; see LEROY, supra note 9, at
2 ("McDonnell Douglas played nine states against each other for its proposed
new MD-12 jumbo jet project, reportedly seeking $1 billion for perhaps 3,000 to
5,000 jobs."). Businesses thus have emerged as the incentive game's biggest
winners and have tremendous financial reason to prolong its run. See, e.g.,
AULDE, supra note 23, at 3 (commenting that "the only thing that is certain
[about incentives] is that potentially massive windfalls accrue to industry").
One critic explained: "To a great extent, the business community has been
able to influence legislative policy by playing one state against the other and
convincing neighboring states of the need to keep their tax structures
competitive with each other." WILSON, supra note 14, at 23 (citing Sandra
Kanter, A History of State Business Subsidies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 70TH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS 424 (1977)). Another article
likened the competition among states for development projects to a "civil war"
and commented that "the competition to attract new jobs or just maintain the
status quo has taken on a ferocity that makes the economic development wars
of the past look like incidental firefights." Robert Guskind, The New Civil War,
25 NATL J. 817, 817 (1993); see also Mahtesian, supra note 6, at 36 (noting that
there is no end in sight to the incentive competition among the states).
34. In 1993, the National Governors' Association (NGA) voted to accept a
policy statement condoning the use of incentives to attract industry. Gary Enos,
Where's the Teeth?, CITY & STATE, Sept. 26, 1993, at 3. The agreement,
however, lacked any meaningful enforcement mechanism and hence did not
induce significant changes in behavior. See id. (expressing doubt that the
agreement, with its absence of enforcement mechanisms, would induce any real
changes). One article, dubious of the agreement's significance, ironically noted
that Illinois Governor Jim Edgar, one of the architects of the agreement,
authorized an incentive deal for Tootsie Roll Industries worth over $20 million
before he left for the NGA conference and a tax incentive package worth nearly
$30 million for Nabisco when he returned from the conference. Mahtesian,
supra note 6, at 36.
35. See Mahtesian, supra note 6, at 36 (noting that agreements have not
changed the behavior of most public officials).
36. One commentator noted:
[S]tate and local governments are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma.
Although competing governmental units would enjoy the greatest
economic benefit if no incentives were offered and, unlike the prisoner
in the classic prisoner's dilemma, states and localities can at least
communicate their desires to one another, they still have no means to
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Reluctant participation, however, has not translated into
caution. Many state and local officials give incentive packages
away without carefully measuring the costs of those packages
against their potential benefits.3" Almost all of the studies on
the effectiveness of business incentives stress that governments
providing such incentives need to do a much better job of
performing cost/benefit analysis before giving their money
away. 8 Failure to perform such analysis results in failure to
recognize bad investments and often leaves governments with
little or nothing to show for monumental expenditures.
Startling cases of subsidy abuse are common. In Hammond,
Indiana, for example, the Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs, a
community and labor supported group, surveyed sixteen
businesses that had received tax breaks under an economic
development program in 1988."9 The businesses, which saved
more than fifteen million dollars in taxes, had promised to create
over 800 jobs.4" None of the businesses, however, followed
through on their pledges, and five of the businesses actually
eliminated a total of 101 jobs.41 Furthermore, Hammond had
no recourse to its fruitless investment because it did not
condition its investment or include any kind of accountability
enforce an agreement not to grant subsidies. Faced with the likelihood
that some governments will cheat and enact incentives, other
governments will follow suit to ensure they are not placed at a
competitive disadvantage.
Taylor, supra note 14, at 693.
37. Of 34 states responding to a survey by the National Governors
Association, only nine had any reporting requirements for businesses that
receive public money, and only six reported having penalty provisions to insure
accountability. LEROY, supra note 9, at 5. The survey also revealed that only
eight of 34 responding states use job quality as a criteria to determine which
companies get aid. Id. Greg LeRoy concludes, "most states and cities still are
not performing meaningful cost-benefit analysis." Id.
38. See AULDE, supra note 23, at 67-69 (calling for a "holistic cost/benefit
approach" to incentive policy analysis); HAMILTON, supra note 24, at 148 (noting
that cost/benefit analysis "is critically important to policy makers and
development officials who must allocate limited financial resources among
competing projects"); REGAN, supra note 1, at 46 (calling for every state and
municipality to establish accounting standards to help facilitate the recording
of the costs and benefits associated with incentive programs); WILSON, supra
note 14, at 28 (positing that "[fluture guidelines must incorporate quantifiable
cost/benefit measures").
39. LEROY, supra note 9, at 6.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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provision in the agreement.42 Such examples of waste have
inspired many states to experiment with provisions that would
ensure a degree of accountability in the incentive packages they
grant.
43
C. ACCOUNTABILITY PROVISIONS IN SUBSIDY AGREEMENTS
After seeing little or no return on their costly investments
in economic development projects, a number of state and local
governments brought their grievances to court.4" In the
absence of explicit terms, however, the courts repeatedly have
refused to recognize subsidy agreements as contracts,45  and
42. Id. For another example, Pennsylvania, after winning a bidding battle
with Ohio, granted Volkswagen a financial package worth $71 million, in
anticipation that the automaker would build a plant employing as many as
20,000 workers. Mahtesian, supra note 6, at 39. The plant, however, never
employed more than 6000 workers, 3000 of which were laid off just five years
after the plant opened. Id. The plant closed for good within ten years of the
original agreement, leaving Pennsylvania with little to show for its considerable
expenditure. Id. at 40.
43. See Ernest Swiger, Avoiding "Sticky" Business Relocations, CORP.
BOARD, July 1993, at 16 (noting that a number of states have begun to
"formalize aspects of the incentive process," and condoning a more "business-
like" approach to government incentives); see also Waits & Heffernon, supra
note 29, at 37 (arguing that while incentives are potentially useful economic
development tools, they should be made legally binding to ensure accountabili-
ty). This sentiment represents a move away from the days of unconditional and
often irresponsible handouts. One recent newspaper article commented that
"the 'candy store' approach to economic development in the United States is
becoming a thing of the past." Carlile, supra note 9, at El.
44. Many victimized state and local governments have alleged that the
incentive agreement was a contract that bound the recipient business to
perform. They have attempted to recoup their losses by claiming that the
business's failure to perform constituted a breach. See, e.g., City of Yonkers v.
Otis Elevator Co., 649 F. Supp. 716, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (ruling recipient of
financial assistance made no explicit commitment to city and therefore the
financial package did not constitute a contract); Ypsilanti v. General Motors
Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Mich Ct. App. 1993) (ruling a tax abatement did
not create a contract between the city and its recipient); In re Indenture of
Trust, 437 N.W.2d 430, 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (denying that an incentive
agreement created a contract prohibiting the transfer of equipment and
employment out of the state).
45. Most courts generally have held that subsidy agreements, in and of
themselves, do not create binding contracts. E.g., Ypsilanti, 506 N.W.2d at 562.
The Minnesota city of Duluth, for example, brought suit against the owner of
a handtool manufacturing plant who, after seeking and ultimately receiving
significant public assistance to modernize and expand its plant in Duluth,
transferred equipment to another plant in South Carolina and drastically
lowered production and employment at the Duluth plant. Indenture of Trust,
437 N.W.2d at 430. Although the district court determined the defendant's
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have continued to deny claims that the pledges made by
businesses to entice lucrative subsidy agreements amount to
promissory estoppel.4" Despite the efforts of victimized local
governments, unions, and community groups, the courts have
made it clear they will not take responsibility for demanding
post facto accountability from the recipients of irresponsible
public handouts. Quite to the contrary, the cases demonstrate
that state and local governments wanting to place limits on
businesses receiving public incentive-aid need to make those
expectations clear before they give their money away.47 Incen-
tive-agreement accountability became a hot topic in state
legislatures only after it proved to be largely unattainable in the
courtroom.
1. Accountability Options
Many state and local governments have begun to take
proactive steps to ensure public investments in private compa-
nies yield tangible public benefits. Although potential account-
ability mechanisms are diverse in their magnitude and im-
pact,' job quality provisions and European-born49 clawback
actions were in bad faith, the court of appeals ruled that the parties made no
explicit agreements about employment levels or equipment transfers. Id. at
436. The appellate court, therefore, overruled the district court's decision and
denied the city's breach of contract claim. Id.; see also City of Yonkers, 649 F.
Supp. at 728 (concluding that the defendant corporation made no explicit
commitments to the city when it accepted financial assistance and therefore the
financial package did not constitute a contract).
46. Although businesses and corporations, when lobbying for incentive
packages, frequently boast of the many things that they will bring to a
community, including jobs and a stable tax base, the courts generally have held
that such posturing does not create legally enforceable promises. See, e.g.,
Ypsilanti, 506 N.W.2d at 559 (noting that promissory estoppel requires "a clear
and definite promise").
47. The court in City of Yonkers, for example, commented that the city was
essentially asking the court to enforce a contract for which it itself had not
bargained. 649 F. Supp. at 722.
48. Greg LeRoy identifies eight types of provisions which different states
have utilized to encourage accountability: right-to-know laws, clawback and job-
creation guarantees, anti-poaching protections, advance notice requirements, job
quality requirements, target hiring and affirmative action requirements,
environmental protection requirements, and eminent domain power. LEROY,
supra note 9, at 25-120.
49. Western European nations historically have implemented more
generous incentive programs than the United States. See Larry C. Ledebur &
Douglas Woodward, Adding a Stick to the Carrot: Location Incentives with
Clawbacks, Rescissions, and Recalibrations, 4 ECON. DEV. Q. 221, 226-27 (1990)
(discussing the use of clawbacks in European business incentives). These
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provisions are the most talked about and perhaps most contro-
versial because of the burden they place on businesses. °
Job-quality provisions require companies receiving public aid
to provide "good" jobs.5 Such requirements are based on the
notion that low-wage, low-benefit jobs do not provide meaningful
benefits to the public-they typically evaluate job quality in
terms of wages and benefits.52  Some business advocates
adamantly oppose these efforts as conditions on financial
incentives, arguing such requirements place an undue burden on
business.53
Clawback provisions face much of the same criticism.
Clawbacks, which function in a variety of ways, legally enable
governments to recapture public subsidies to private businesses
when those businesses fail to deliver promised benefits to the
public.54 The intent of such provisions is to make incentives quid
nations, however, are much more likely than is the United States to approach
subsidy agreements as contractual relationships. Id. Most European nations,
in fact, use clawback provisions with every form of industrial subsidy they
grant. Id. Tax concessions, employment creation subsidies, capital grants,
loans, and interest subsidies are all structured in a way that ensures recipients
of public aid are accountable to the public. Id.; see generally DOUGLAS YULILL
& KEvIN ALLEN, EUROPEAN REGIONAL INCENTIVES (1980) (discussing European
incentive programs and accountability measures).
50. See Swiger, supra note 43, at 17 (noting that clawback provisions may
cause a business to believe a state or community is anti-business, and thus may
actually discourage investment).
51. Job-quality requirements stem from the notion that most communities
suffer, not from a lack of jobs, but from a lack of good jobs. Robert Reich
explains:
[T]he important issue over the longer term is the quality of jobs, not
the number. By the 1990s, many jobs failed to provide a living wage.
More than half of the 32.5 million Americans whose incomes fell under
the official poverty line-and nearly two-thirds of all poor chil-
dren-lived in households with at least one worker. This is a higher
rate of working poor than at any other time in the postwar era.
REICH, supra note 17, at 203.
52. See LEROY, supra note 9, at 84-91 (describingjob-quality provisions that
various states and cities have implemented).
53. See infra note 59 (describing recent opposition to job-quality require-
ments).
54. Ledebur & Woodward, supra note 49, at 227. Ledebur and Woodward
write that governments have three options when implementing clawbacks: they
can attempt to recapture the amount of the subsidy equal to the unrealized
benefits; they can attempt to recover the amount of the subsidy in excess of
realized benefits; or they can attempt to recapture the entire value of the
subsidy. Id. at 228-29. Ledebur and Woodward describe three related types of
provisions which potentially could work in conjunction with clawbacks:
recisions, penalties, and recalibrations. Id. at 227.
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pro quo agreements. 55 Clawbacks help ensure the public gets
what it pays for, or that at least it has some mechanism of
redress if it does not.
Other significant accountability measures legally guarantee
the public's right to know about the quantity and cost of
business incentives.56 "Right-to-know" laws are less controver-
sial, but no less important. Right-to-know laws typically require
recipients of public money to make public projections, at the
time they apply for the money, about the benefits they will
provide the public. The laws also require recipients to report
periodically on their performance after they begin receiving
funds.57 Their purpose is to keep the' distribution of public
money in the public's eye.5"
2. Accountability in Practice
A number of states and municipalities either have recently
passed or are in the process of considering legislation with
accountability provisions designed to protect public invest-
ments.59 Most of this legislation, however, applies only to
Recision provisions give the government the right to cancel the subsidy
agreement in the event of nonperformance. Id. at 228. Penalties tend to be
employed in addition to clawback provisions and enable the government to
penalize nonperforming businesses beyond the cost of the subsidy. Id. at 229.
Recalibrations, in the alternative, are provisions that let the government
readjust the subsidy in accordance with the business's changed ability to
provide benefits to the community. Recalibrations, in their various manifesta-
tions, enable governments to change the amount they are giving to better reflect
what they are getting in return. Id.
55. In the absence of clawback provisions, the courts fail to construe
incentives as quid pro quo agreements. See supra note 45 (discussing cases in
which the courts have ruled that incentives, in and of themselves, do not
constitute contracts).
56. See LEROY, supra note 9, at 25-42 (discussing right-to-know laws).
57. Id. at 25-26. Wisconsin, for example, requires businesses applying for
loans and bonds from the state Economic Development Authority to estimate
the number of jobs the project will create and destroy. WIS. STAT. § 66.521
(1995). The law also demands that recipients publicly report on the accuracy
of their estimates after the project is completed. Id.
58. See LEROY, supra note 9, at 25 (noting that incentive deals are typically
made with little or no public input).
59. Connecticut recently passed legislation demanding repayment from
recipients of state-sponsored financial assistance who relocate out of the state
within ten years of receiving the assistance. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-5a
(1993). The city of St. Paul, Minnesota, in contrast, voted on November 7, 1995,
to reject a city ordinance that would require corporate recipients of city money
to create at least one new job that pays no less than a poverty-level wage as
defined by the federal poverty standards for a family of four. This amounts to
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recipients of public money whose actions actually worsen
economic conditions in the state, and not those that fail to
improve them. In addition, most codified clawback provisions
only require businesses that relocate out of the state or reduce
employment levels in the community to repay their public
money.0
Clawback provisions that actually recapture funds from
businesses which fail to create new jobs are more rare. Iowa
and Nebraska are among the few states that have these limited
job creation clawbacks.6' These provisions apply to state
funding allocated through specific economic development
$7.21 per hour. The ordinance had both vocal critics and adamant supporters.
Compare Mel Duncan, St. Paul Jobs Ordinance Will Promote Decent-Wage Jobs,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 31, 1995, at 9A (arguing that the ordinance, by
promoting the creation of good jobs, would have a positive effect on the city)
with William Given, No: It Would Hinder Job Development, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, Oct. 10, 1995, at 7A (suggesting that a poverty-level wage requirement
would impose an oppressive burden on start-up businesses and stifle job
creation).
60. Although Connecticut's law does not require recipients of public money
to create jobs, it only requires that the state Department of Economic
Development, when reviewing applications for financial assistance, consider "the
extent to which the project will likely result in the retention and creation of
jobs." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-223(b)(A) (1993).
Similarly, a recent Ohio statute orders that the state's Tax Credit Authority
only provide tax credits to corporate taxpayers if it determines that the
taxpayer's project will create new jobs in the state. OHIO ADmIN. CODE § 122:7-
1-05 (1994). Like Connecticut, Ohio does not require recipients who fall to
create new jobs to repay the value of the credit. The Ohio law does, however,
stipulate that "the authority may prospectively reduce the percentage and term
of the tax credit set forth in the tax agreement" for businesses failing to meet
required levels of employment. Id. § 122:7-1-08.
61. Nebraska, as part of its Employment and Investment Growth Act,
requires businesses that receive incentives to pay back all or a portion of those
incentives if they fail to meet required levels of employment. The statute
states: "If the taxpayer fails either to meet the required levels of employment
or investments for the applicable project.., all or a portion of the incentives
set forth in the Employment and Investment Growth Act shall be recaptured or
disallowed." NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4101 (1993).
Iowa requires similar performance from businesses that receive funds from
its Community Betterment Program. IOWA CODE ANN. § 15.330 (1994).
Furthermore, Iowa's law thoroughly defines what happens in the event of
default. The clawback provision in the law is significant because it is not an
all-or-nothing clawback. Iowa's law recognizes partial achievement and allows
partially achieving businesses to keep the amount of the subsidy that is
proportional to the benefit it has provided to the state. Id.
1594 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1579
programs,62 and they require businesses that benefit from the
programs to meet job creation goals. If they do not, the
clawback provisions require that the businesses repay all or part
of the benefit they have received through subsidies, tax abate-
ments, or low interest loans.
These clawback provisions, however, typically apply only to
money doled out through the specific programs or acts of which
they are a part.63 In other words, they are not comprehensive
and do not apply to all state money distributed to private
businesses to promote economic growth. Before 1995, in fact, no
state had addressed comprehensively the problem of holding
businesses accountable for the jobs they promised to create
before they received state-sponsored subsidies.
The lack of thorough legislative attention, however, stood in
the face of growing public concern over corporate accounta-
bility." Subsidy abuse and corporate welfare had become
attention-grabbing issues, and the public was interested.65
Critics began calling for accountability and one scholar even
produced a model corporate welfare statute that demanded
legislators tighten their grip on the public's money.66 The stage
was set, and in April 1995, the state of Minnesota passed
62. Neither the Iowa law nor the Nebraska law applies to all of the money
that the state allocates to private businesses for economic development. Both
laws apply only to programs of which they are a part. See IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 15.330 (applying to aid distributed through the Community Economic
Betterment Program); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4101 (applying to aid distributed
through the Employment and Investment Growth Act).
63. In Nebraska, for example, the job creation clawbacks only apply to
subsidies and abatements issued through the Employment and Investment
Growth Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4101, and in Iowa the job creation clawback
applies only to funds distributed through the Community Economic Betterment
Program. IOWA CODE ANN. § 15.330.
64. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (describing increasing calls
for cost/benefit analysis and accountability).
65. See supra note 8 (describing increasing public outrage over irresponsible
incentive deals).
66. ROBERT W. BENSON, GETTING BusINEssEs OFF THE PUBLIC DOLE 7-8
(1995). The statute begins with the rebuttable presumption that incentive
packages are illegal gifts of public property that may only be justified by a "cost-
benefit analysis showing a net return to the people of the state." Id. § 3, at 7.
The statute requires any private business seeking financial aid from the state
to subject its proposal to such cost-benefit analysis. Id. § 3(a). It further
stipulates that a governmental body may terminate funding and assess the
recipient business for repayment of all benefits received, plus interest, plus a
penalty of five percent if it determines, after notice and hearing, that the
business has failed to comply with its commitments. Id. § 3(c), at 8.
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legislation that pushed accountability to the forefront of state-
sponsored economic development initiatives.
D. ACCOUNTABILITY IN MINNESOTA
In 1994, the state of Minnesota extended over $973 million
worth of tax abatements, tax cuts, financing breaks, and
subsidies to private corporations.67 At the same time, the state
directed only twenty million dollars toward work readiness
programs" and $123 million toward the federal Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program.6 9 Alarmed by the amount
of public money lining private pockets and still wary from recent
publicly-financed fiascos,7" citizens' groups began to push for
legislation that would insure some returns on the public's $973
million investment."'
A group of receptive legislators responded to these concerns.
67. See MINNESOTA ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESSIvE ACTION, REPORT ON
CORPORATE WELFARE 3 (1995) (summarizing Minnesota corporate welfare costs).
The Minnesota Alliance for Progressive Action (MAPA) reports that in 1994, the
state imparted $548.4 million to private businesses through corporate tax
expenditures, $159 million through changes in property tax classification rates,
$257.8 million through tax increment financing, and $8.1 million through grants
and loans by the state's Department of Trade and Economic Development. Id.
In arriving at its figures, MAPA used the state's definition of a tax
expenditure: "an exemption, deduction, credit, reduced rate, or other mechanism
which lowers the amount of tax revenue that would otherwise be collected." Id.
at 4. MAPA added the 1990 to 1994 reductions in the commercial and
industrial property tax classification rate from 5.06% to 4.6% because such
reductions cost the state an estimated $159 million that could have gone toward
local governments and schools. Id. at 7. Similarly, MAPA commented that tax
increment financing "allows a percentage of the property taxes due on a
development project to be 'captured' to pay for a portion of the developer's costs.
A significant portion of the taxes the developer pays, thus do not contribute to
the general local services they would otherwise go toward." Id. at 8. In 1994,
the Department of Trade and Economic Development issued grants and loans
through four specific programs: the Economic Development Program, the
Challenge Grant Program, the Tourism Loan Program, and the Capital Access
Program. Id. at 10.
68. Id. at 3-4.
69. Id.
70. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (describing the financial
package Minnesota extended to Northwest Airlines and Northwest's subsequent
failure to deliver on its commitments).
71. For example, MAPA demanded: "If we are going to offer public
assistance to corporations we have a right to expect certain commitments back
just as we do from all aid recipients. This commitment might be one to create
jobs and pay a livable wage for instance." MINNESOTA ALLIANCE FOR PROGRES-
SIVE ACTION, supra note 67, at 2.
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They introduced a bill in the Minnesota House of Representa-
tives that became known as the "corporate welfare bill."72 The
bill as passed in the state House required business recipients of
public money for economic development projects to create new
jobs and pay at least a poverty-level wage." The bill's authors
described the bill as a reasonable accountability requirement.74
Adamant critics in the state's gubernatorial administration,
however, believed a minimum wage requirement made bad
economic sense.7' Hence, although the bill's emergence from
the Senate and eventual ratification was significant,7 the bill
itself was considerably scaled down.77
1. Minnesota's Corporate Welfare Law
Under Minnesota's corporate welfare statute, a business
72. See, e.g., Dennis J. McGrath, House Panel Approves "Corporate Welfare
Bill," STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 5, 1995, at 1B (describing the bill after
House Panel approval).
73. H.R. 869, § 1(1)(b), 79th Sess. (Minn. 1995). The bill exempted small
businesses and nonprofits. See id. (stating the bill "applies to any for-profit
corporation... that does not meet the definition of a small business. . ."). It
also provided for a number of circumstantial exemptions. See id. (exempting,
for example, state assistance for hazardous waste removal).
74. Karen Clark, the bill's chief sponsor, wrote:
[T]he bill simply requires that certain businesses that apply for a
significant amount of public assistance saying they want to create new
jobs must actually do so by creating at least one new job within two
years and must pay at least poverty-level wages for the job(s). Isn't
this just basic and minimal accountability for businesses that want a
significant amount of public assistance from taxpayers? How can
anyone object to that... ?
Karen Clark, Letters from Readers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 29, 1995, at
A16.
75. Peter Gillette, Commissioner ofthe Minnesota Department of Trade and
Economic Development, for example, wrote that the bill imposed unnecessarily
heavy burdens on recipient businesses, thereby making Minnesota less
attractive to businesses looking to expand. E. Peter Gillette Jr., Letters from
Readers, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 26, 1995, at A18.
76. It is significant that any legislation passed at all. No state previously
had passed accountability legislation that applied to all money that the state
issued to private businesses for economic development. See supra notes 65-71
and accompanying text (detailing the absence of, and building sentiment for,
accountability legislation).
77. The law the Senate ultimately passed not only omitted the wage
requirements from the original bill, but it also left out provisions defining the
bill's various exemptions. Compare H.R. 869,79th Sess. (Minn. 1995) (including
more and stronger accountability provisions, and clearly defining the exemp-
tions within the bill) with Act of May 24, 1995, ch. 224, § 58, 1995 Minn. Laws
1686 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991 (West Supp. 1996)) (the enacted
Senate bill was S. 1670, 79th Sess. (Minn. 1995)).
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receiving state financial aid for economic or job-growth purposes
"must create a net increase in jobs in Minnesota within two
years of receiving the assistance."78 This requirement is the
law's essence. 9
The law's teeth, however, lie in the second paragraph's
enforcement mechanism. This requirement expresses the
legislation's controversial accountability, or "clawback," pro-
vision.8" According to this provision, businesses that fail to
meet wage and job-creation goals set by a government agency
must "repay the assistance to the government agency."81
Ostensibly, this paragraph enables the government to recapture
public money that has been allocated poorly to projects that do
not provide meaningful benefits to the public.8 2
The laws third paragraph guarantees the public's right to
know about economic development projects upon which the state
is spending public money. It requires governmental agencies
distributing economic development money to businesses to report
the goals and subsequent results of those projects to Minnesota's
Department of Trade and Economic Development.8  The
78. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991 (West Supp. 1996). The use of the word
"must" in statutory language typically creates a condition precedent. REED
DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 214 (2d ed. 1986). In this
paragraph and in those that follow, however, the law uses "must" not to
establish a condition precedent, but to impart a duty, in the same sense that the
term "shall" imparts duty. Id. Black's Law Dictionary notes that "[the word
'must'], like the word 'shall,' is primarily of mandatory effect.., and in that
sense is used in antithesis to 'may.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1019 (6th ed.
1990) (citation omitted). Hence, the first paragraph functions as a command:
businesses that receive financial aid from the state have the duty to create new
jobs in the state.
79. The law is fundamentally an accountability law, and the law's first
paragraph defines it as such.
80. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose
and function of clawback provisions).
81. The second paragraph, in full, states: "The government agency providing
the assistance must establish wage level and job creation goals to be met by the
business receiving the assistance. A business that fails to meet the goals must
repay the assistance to the government agency." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991,
para. 2 (West Supp. 1996). This paragraph, in effect, modifies the duty
established by the first paragraph, and defines the consequence of failing to
comply with this duty. The second paragraph does not establish a time frame
in which the recipient business must meet these goals. Presumably, the
recipient business must meet its goals within two years, as the first paragraph
requires. This time limitation, however, is not entirely clear from the law's text.
82. Id.
83. The third paragraph requires every state government agency granting
economic development aid to record the goals and results of each project, and
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Department must then publish the results of these reports.84
The point of this provision is to shine some light on the deals
politicians and business leaders have been notorious for making
in the dark. 5
The fourth paragraph contains definitions of the laws terms
and is perhaps more significant for what it excludes than for
what it includes. The paragraph states that "'assistance' means
a grant or loan in excess of $25,000 or tax increment financing,"
but it defines no other terms.86 The law does not thoroughly
explain how or to whom it applies.
II. MINNESOTA'S CORPORATE WELFARE LAW:
STRONG ON SUBSTANCE, WEAK ON FORM
It is questionable whether business incentives, in any of
their various manifestations, effectively promote economic
growth.s7  In fact, much analysis suggests they do not."8  A
number of scholars and critics firmly believe the proliferation of
.compile and publish the results of the reports for the previous calendar year
by June 1 of each year." Id. § 116J.991, para. 3. The use of the word "shall"
mandates that the Department of Trade and Economic Development compile
that information and make it available to the public. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 1375 (noting that "shall" is mandatory in effect).
84. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991, para. 3.
85. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose
of and need for "right-to-know" provisions).
86. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991, para. 4. This paragraph does not define,
nor does any other part of the law, terms and phrases such as "business,"
"economic development," "to be met," "fails to meet," or "repay." In the absence
of any definition, limitation, or modification of these terms and phrases, they
must assume their plain meaning. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1994) (proclaiming,
"[w~hen the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear
and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under
the pretext of pursuing the spirit"); Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. St.
Paul, 61 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Minn. 1953) ("It is elementary that where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous the statute is not open to
construction.").
87. Most studies on effectiveness of business incentives as tools to promote
economic development note that the process is filled with uncertainty, and that
incentives do not appear to affect employment levels significantly. See supra
note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the results of various studies on
business incentives). Many scholars and critics thus believe that given the
budget constraints under which state and local governments operate, the
public's money could be put to more effective and state-wide beneficial uses.
See supra note 30 (discussing the financial pressures on state and local
governments).
88. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (describing conclusions
from empirical tests on the efficacy of business incentives).
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incentives has had negative repercussions in the economy.89
State governments, however, have steadfastly refused to
discontinue their use.90 Minnesota's law functions within this
context, attempting to grapple with an issue that begs attention.
Accountability, although a worthy proposition, is a difficult one.
Minnesota's corporate welfare statute is significant because it
attempts to ensure real and meaningful returns on state-funded
economic development projects, but ultimately fails to provide
adequate means to achieve this goal.
A. STRONG ON SUBSTANCE
Minnesota's corporate welfare legislation is significant for
what it seeks to do: The law attempts to ensure public money
furthers a public, and not merely a private, good. 1 Polarized
economic opportunities have left many neighborhoods and cities
in need,92 and tremendous pressure on the limited public
resources make it difficult for governments to address those
needs.93 The problems confronting most local governments
continue to swell, but available resources seldom keep pace.94
Overextending those resources is an increasingly unpopular and
unfeasible option.95 State and local governments face the
challenge of putting their limited resources to the most produc-
tive and efficient use.96 Minnesota's corporate welfare statute
89. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing business
incentives' interference with market competition and optimal economic
efficiency).
90. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (noting that states have
been reluctant to discontinue their use unilaterally for fear of being left at a
competitive disadvantage).
91. Previously, the public had no effective means of redress when states
spent public money ineffectively or inefficiently. See supra notes 39-43 and
accompanying text (noting that public officials often grant incentives carelessly
and leave the public without legal redress). Minnesota's law merely seeks to
ensure that the public sees a return on its investment. See supra note 74
(quoting the original bill's chief sponsor).
92. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (describing the ramifica-
tions that the national economic shifts have had for most Americans).
93. See supra note 30 (describing the financial pressure under which most
state governments find themselves).
94. See supra notes 17, 30 (describing the difficulties confronting state and
local governments).
95. See supra note 30 (discussing the financial crisis many cities already
face).
96. It is extremely important that governments carefully consider and
analyze how they spend their money. The challenge for public officials is to
make sure that the limited resources are spent effectively. This Note analyzes
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is a step in that direction. The law seeks to ensure that with so
much pressing public need, the state does not needlessly donate
its scarce resources to private corporations that will not trans-
form those resources into a tangible public benefit.
97
Minnesota's corporate welfare legislation is a move toward
accountability in an environment that demands it."
1. Guaranteeing Businesses Create Jobs
The goal of most economic development initiatives is to spur
economic growth, which analysts frequently define in terms of
employment growth. 9 Hence, when state governments grant
incentives to new or expanding businesses, their intent is
usually to create or maintain employment in the state."°°
Granting incentives, however, does not guarantee that the
recipient business will in turn create employment growth. 1 1
Uncertainty enshrouds the process."' The job-creation guar-
antee in Minnesota's legislation seeks to add a reasonable
amount of certainty, and thus conceptually lies on a solid
foundation.
10 3
Minnesota's law takes an important step toward accounta-
bility by requiring businesses receiving financial assistance for
economic development to actually create new jobs in the state
within two years."°  The provision transforms incentive and
Minnesota's corporate welfare law as a means of ensuring that if policy makers
do decide to spend the public's money on economic development projects, they
choose those projects that will yield some public benefit.
97. Cities and states that failed to take such precautions and lost much
needed resources serve as stark reminders of the cost of carelessness. See supra
notes 39-42 and accompanying text (describing examples of wasted public
expenditures).
98. As it has become more conscious of the tremendous waste and
inefficiency associated with governmental expenditures, the public has become
more vocal in its cry for accountability. See, e.g., supra note 71 (quoting one
citizens' group as saying"we have a right to expect certain commitments back").
99. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing what public
officials mean by "economic development").
100. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (noting the purpose of
financial incentives).
101. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (describing examples of
costly incentives that did not result in significant employment growth).
102. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (questioning efficacy of
incentive agreements as tools to inspire economic development).
103. If the goal of economic development is to create jobs, then it is
reasonable to require businesses receiving financial assistance for economic
development projects actually to create jobs.
104. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991 (West Supp. 1996).
1600
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subsidy packages from unconditional handouts'0 5 into quid pro
quo agreements. 10 6 It pushes these financial aid packages into
the realm of contract and mutual responsibility, and effectively
eliminates private incentive to take advantage of a state's
generosity unscrupulously. °
Furthermore, the law holds businesses responsible for the
pledges they make and encourages them realistically to assess
the job creation potential of their projects when they apply to the
state for financial assistance.'08 Governmental agencies that
make more accurate projections will be better able to perform
accurate cost/benefit analysis of the projects they consider for
financial aid. Hence, the job requirement provision ultimately
may serve to encourage and improve the kind of cost/benefit
analysis historically absent from the process.'09
105. Businesses that receive financial incentives generally have no legal
obligation to the governments that grant them because the courts have refused
to acknowledge subsidy agreements as contracts in and of themselves, and
typically refuse to infer obligations into subsidy agreements unless the parties
agree to specific terms. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text
(describing litigation surrounding financial incentives).
106. In City of Yonkers, the court held that when "clear language... [is] set
forth as a goal and not a binding obligation," courts cannot enforce the
agreement because "disappointed expectations are not synonymous with the
breach of a contractual obligation." City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 649
F. Supp. 716, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Minnesota's law, in effect, bargains for the
public's expectations. The law makes it very clear that if the state issues
money to a private business it expects that the business will, in turn, create
new jobs in the state. See MMIN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991 (West Supp. 1996).
107. Recipient businesses clearly benefit from financial incentives. Many
business leaders understand that they can raise the value of an incentive
package, and increase the benefit to their companies, by playing states off of
each other, or by opening themselves up to the "highest bidder." See supra note
33 (noting that businesses, which potentially receive massive windfalls, are the
only clear winners in the incentive game).
108. Businesses, in the absence of accountability provisions, do not have an
incentive to refrain from inflating their job creation projections. To the
contrary, they have an incentive to present proposals that will win them the
largest subsidy or tax abatement.
109. Analysts agree that if governments continue to grant financial
incentives, they need to do a better job of performing cost/benefit analysis.
Supra note 38 and accompanying text. While the clawback provision in
Minnesota's law does not require that parties perform cost/benefit analysis, by
imposing penalties on business which fail to meet their goals, it will encourage
more realistic projections. More accurate projections, in turn, will enable the
governmental agency to weigh more completely the costs against potential
benefits.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
2. The Public's Right-to-Know
The "right-to-know" provision similarly serves two important
functions. First, and most importantly, the provision removes
the element of secrecy from the incentive process; it requires
each state agency that grants financial assistance packages to
submit annual reports to the Department of Trade and Economic
Development and requires the department to compile and
publish those reports.110 This requirement will make the
process publicly visible, and while this does not necessarily
guarantee the process will be more efficient,"' it does increase
the likelihood that elected officials will be more careful about the
number and quality of incentive packages they authorize." 2
In doing so, the provision encourages the architects of incentive
packages to perform cost/benefit analysis which, otherwise, they
typically fail to do." 3
The right-to-know provision in Minnesota's law also is
noteworthy because it fosters a degree of centralization in the
economic development process. By requiring all agencies that
financially encourage economic development to submit reports to
a single, centralized agency, the provision enables comprehensive
analysis of the state's various economic development programs,
and eliminates much of the inefficiency and duplication that
results in the absence of such a centralizing force."'
110. See LEROY, supra note 9, at 25 (commenting that politicians and
business leaders often make incentive deals with little public awareness or
input).
111. Making subsidy agreements more visible to the public does not
guarantee that projects will produce better results. Minnesota's deal with
Northwest Airlines, for example, was made amid much publicity. That project,
however, failed to yield the benefits which the airline originally promised. See
supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (describing Minnesota's 1991 deal with
Northwest Airlines).
112. Ostensibly, right-to-know provisions, by putting incentives under the
public's eye, more tangibly ties the incentive to the politicians who design them.
Hence, the politicians will be accountable for their failures. See supra notes 56-
58 and accompanying text (discussing right-to-know provisions).
113. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (noting that although
almost all studies on the efficacy of incentives have called for more and better
cost/benefit analysis, many governments continue to grant subsidies carelessly).
114. Some analysts have commented that states could better, curtail
irresponsible subsidies and perform more accurate cost/benefit analysis if each
state had only one agency that dealt with incentives. See REGAN, supra note 1,
at 46 (suggesting incentives would be more efficient if only one agency issued
them).
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Conceptually, both the job-creation and right-to-know
provisions in Minnesota's corporate welfare law effectively
further the cause of accountability. Both are solid mechanisms
that help ensure the public sees tangible returns on its invest-
ments. Unfortunately, Minnesota's statute suffers from a lack
of overall clarity that ultimately will prevent it from achieving
its solid substantive goals.
B. WEAK ON FORM
Minnesota's legislation, despite its conceptual strength,
suffers from several technical deficiencies. In particular, the
statute fails to modify or define crucial terms and concepts such
as "business," "job," "fails to meet the goals," and "repay.""5
These are the terms that give the clawback provision force, yet
the statute does not explain them.
In the absence of definition, the courts will assign these
terms their plain meaning."6 According to the plain language
of the law, any business of any size that fails to meet its job
creation and wage-level goals, no matter how close it comes to
achieving those goals, must return all of the assistance it
received." 7 The statute treats a 4000-employee business that
attains only fifteen percent of its job-creation goal the same as
it treats a ten-employee business that attains ninety percent of
its job-creation goal. The statute fails to define its logistics and
lacks overall clarity. It does not prorate or scale its penalty to
reflect partial achievement, it does not define when and how a
noncomplying business must repay the state, 18 and it does not
115. The only term the statute defines is "assistance." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 116J.991, para. 4 (West Supp. 1996). The absence of definitions is significant
because clawbacks pose a number of complex problems and could function in a
variety of different ways. See supra note 54 (examining recision, penalty, and
recalibration clawback provisions).
116. Where the plain language of a law is clear, the courts will not look to
the law's purpose or intent for interpretive assistance. MINN. STAT. § 645.16
(1988); Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. City of St. Paul, 61 N.W.2d 533,
535-36 (Minn. 1953).
117. Minnesota's law, for example, fails to address scenarios in which
recipient businesses create some new jobs but fail to meet their goals. As the
law stands, a business that meets 90% of its goal presumably must repay the
government in full. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991 (West Supp. 1996). Iowa's
law anticipates this scenario and provides for a prorated penalty. IOWA CODE
ANN. § 15.330 (1994).
118. The statute fails to establish a time schedule or method for repayment,
and although these are logistical details, their omission may undermine the
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exempt or differentiate between businesses of different sizes. It
therefore will apply equally to large, small, and nonprofit
businesses, despite obvious concern among public officials and
business leaders that small businesses and nonprofits face
different market obstacles."19
Furthermore, the Minnesota statute could encourage
businesses in jeopardy of not meeting their goals to transform
full-time positions into multiple, part-time positions. 2 ° Unless
the granting governmental agency specifically has contracted
that the jobs must be full-time or of a given type or category,
part-time jobs will, for the purposes of the legislation, be of equal
value.'2' Hence, if the granting governmental agency estab-
lishes a job-creation goal of twenty new jobs for a particular
financial package but fails to qualify or define what type of jobs
they should be, a business that creates fifteen part-time jobs and
only five full-time jobs will have met that goal, whereas a
business that creates eighteen full-time jobs will have not. The
law fails to recognize that the business which created eighteen
full-time jobs most likely would provide a greater net benefit to
the state than would the company that created fifteen part-time
jobs and only five full-time jobs. Forcing the company that
substantially complies to repay all of its assistance and not
forcing repayment from the company that nominally complies
creates unhealthy incentives."
substantive integrity of the statute. Statutes in Iowa and Nebraska do a much
better job of answering these difficult but inevitable questions. See IOWA CODE
ANN. § 15.330; NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4104 (1994); see also supra note 61
(commenting on the clawback provisions in the Iowa and Nebraska statutes).
119. The legislative treatment of small businesses in Minnesota reflects the
sentiment that these businesses are less able to adapt to market changes and
merit differential treatment. See MINN. STAT. § 645.445 (1994) (defining a
"small business" as a business that has fewer than 20 employees and less than
$1,000,000 in annual gross revenue); H.R. 869, 79th Sess. (Minn. 1995)
(exempting businesses that meet the definition of a small business).
120. The Minnesota statute merely calls for "a net increase in jobs." MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 116J.991, para. 1. With large sums of money involved, noncomply-
ing businesses inevitably will seek creative means to avoid repayment.
121. The plain language of the law does not distinguish between part-time
and full-time jobs, and thus the courts will, under the language of the law,
interpret both to qualify as "jobs." While the granting governmental agency
could and should easily get around this problem by defining specifically what
constitutes a "job," there is nothing in the statute that requires any governmen-
tal agency to do so.
122. Businesses that have not met their job creation goals will have strong
incentives to transform full-time positions into multiple part-time jobs so as to
increase the net number of new jobs. This clearly is not consistent with the
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The statute also fails to clarify whether it applies to
financial aid that is intended to maintain employment in the
state. The statute's language states that a business receiving
"assistance for economic development or job growth purposes
must create a net increase in jobs in Minnesota."'2 While
analysts often equate economic development to job creation, the
canon of statutory interpretation that seeks to avoid redun-
dancy.24 would suggest that in this law "economic develop-
ment" and "job creation" are not absolute synonyms. 25 That
canon would suggest economic development, for the purposes of
the statute, also encompasses other goals, such as preventing
jobs from leaving the state. Such an interpretation would
suggest that if a business threatens to relocate its operations to
another state promising improved infrastructure and a better
business climate, and the state of Minnesota decides to offer
financial assistance to prevent the relocation, that business must
create new jobs within two years.'26 While this interpretation
is consistent with the spirit of the law in that it demands perfor-
mance from recipients of public aid, it would likely meet with
adamant opposition from the business community. 7 In any
event the statute is not clear on the issue. It does not precisely
indicate whether or how the law applies when Minnesota gives
financial aid to entities such as Northwest Airlines, Dayton-
Hudson, or even Minnesota's professional basketball team, the
Timberwolves, to ensure that they do not relocate all or part of
their operations out of the state. Such big-name businesses
frequently seek financial aid from the state"2 and it is a
substantive policy which motivated the law.
123. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.991, para. 1.
124. "It is a 'cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision
should be construed to be entirely redundant.'" WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP
P. FRIcKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 644 (1988) (citing Kungys
v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)).
125. To interpret the terms to avoid redundancy, the reader must interpret
"economic development" to include more than just job creation. Hence, the law's
language does not seem to prohibit explicitly a reading which would interpret
economic development to include projects seeking to maintain employment.
126. The plain meaning rule, supra note 86, and the cannon that interprets
to avoid redundancy, supra note 124, would encourage such a reading.
127. Business leaders frequently argue that overly stringent requirements
will cast an "anti-business" shadow over the state. See Swiger, supra note 43,
at 17 (noting the fear that strict requirements will deter investment and job
creation).
128. Both Northwest and the Timberwolves have asked the state for
financial assistance in recent years, and it is inevitable that similar scenarios
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weakness of the statute that its applicability in such situations
is not clear.
III. FILLING THE GAPS: THE IMPROVED INCENTIVE
ACCOUNTABILITY LAW
As one of the first laws in the country that comprehensively
seeks to subject public money targeted toward economic
development to a degree of accountability, Minnesota's corporate
welfare law will serve as a guide for other states. Minnesota's
statute, however, could be more comprehensive in several
obvious ways. This Note proposes a model statute termed the
Improved Incentive Accountability Law (IIAL) 29 to address the
deficiencies in current corporate-incentive accountability
legislation. The IIAL begins with the premise that public money
must be used to benefit the public. It clearly states that its
purpose is to demand accountability from recipients of public
money.30  Furthermore, the HAL clarifies the ambiguities in
Minnesota's law by clearly defining to whom and how its
provisions apply, and by articulating expectations of all the
parties involved.
A. GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES: SHOW US IT'S WORTH IT
The governmental agencies and public officials that grant
incentive agreements often are as responsible for wasteful and
inefficient agreements as the businesses that fail to deliver
meaningful public benefits.'' The HAL articulates the expec-
tations of these governmental agencies and public officials.'32
Beyond requiring that they compile and publish reports about
the efficacy of their incentive projects, the law requires govern-
mental agencies to demonstrate that the projected benefits of a
recipient project outweigh the projected costs of the project.133
Analysts have almost unanimously called for such systematic
cost/benefit analysis and other states have begun to experiment
will arise in the future. See Mike Meyers, Government Subsidies for Private
Businesses Ought to Be Stopped, STAR TRB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 1, 1995, at D2
(commenting that local politicians have been particularly susceptible to requests
from high profile businesses).
129. Appendix A, infra page 1611.
130. HAL § 1, Appendix A, infra page 1611.
131. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (explaining that
governments carelessly fail to perform cost/benefit analysis).
132. IIAL § 2, Appendix A, infra page 1611.
133. Id. § 2(b).
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with costlbenefit provisions."4 The HAL requires cost/benefit
analysis and, to help ensure governmental agencies accurately
measure costs and benefits,'35 the law requires governments
to calculate the present value of all potential benefits. 116
Conversely, it requires measurements of costs to reflect the
opportunity costs of foregone projects3 7 as well as the financial
costs of the incentive package. By requiring that governmental
agencies perform cost/benefit analysis, the HAL reflects and
defines the government's duty to issue incentives responsibly.
B. RECIPIENT BUSINESSES: WHO, WHAT, AND HOW?
The applicability and logistics of Minnesota's law currently
are unclear. The IIAL clarifies how and to whom its provisions
apply. Business leaders and public officials are particularly
sensitive about imposing requirements on small businesses,
presumably because small businesses are less flexible and less
able to adjust to financial disruptions.' Other legislation has
exempted or differentiated small businesses.3 9 The IIAL does
not exempt these business, but it does recognize that they are
subject to different pressures. 40 The law is more flexible with
such businesses by granting them more time to meet their job
creation goals and defining more leniently the payback schedules
134. A recent Louisiana economic development law requires that a
quantifiable measure of a project's projected benefits exceed the cost of the
state's incentive payments. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2455(E) (West 1995); see
also supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting that almost all studies on the
efficacy of business incentives have called for more and better cost/benefit
analysis).
135. Costs and benefits can be measured in a variety of ways, and while a
detailed description of cost/benefit analyses is beyond the scope of this Note,
other authors have explained thoroughly the methods and difficulties of
measuring costs and benefits of publicly financed projects. E.g., HARVEY S.
ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 238-64 (4th ed. 1995); DAvID L. WEIMER & AiDAN R.
VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS 259-87 (2d ed. 1992).
136. IIAL § 2(b), Appendix A, infra page 1611; see WEIMER & VINING, supra
note 142, at 239 (explaining the concept of "present value").
137. IIAL § 2(b), Appendix A, infra page 1611; see WEIMER & VINING, supra
note 142, at 254-58 (discussing the importance of measuring the opportunity
costs of projects foregone).
138. See, e.g., Given, supra note 59, at A7 (suggesting that small businesses
are less able to withstand increased burdens).
139. See MINN. STAT. § 645.445 (1994) (defining a "small business" as a
business which has fewer than 20 employees and less than $1,000,000 in
annual gross revenue); H.R. 869, 79th Sess. (Minn. 1995) (exempting businesses
that meet the definition of a small business)
140. IIAL § 4, Appendix A, infra page 1611.
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for businesses that fail to meet their goals.' By differentiat-
ing the requirements for small businesses, the HAL addresses
the business community's concerns without compromising the
spirit of accountability.
The HAL also articulates employment-maintenance expecta-
tions for businesses receiving incentive aid. 42  The HAL
maintains that although it may not be practical to require these
businesses to create jobs,"4s they should not be exempt from
current job-provision expectations. The law requires businesses
receiving aid to maintain jobs in the state to stay true to their
word. The IIAL contains a provision that prohibits recipient
businesses from relocating out of the state for at least ten years
after receiving the aid, and demands repayment from those that
do.'4
The HAL also clarifies much of the ambiguity that clouds
the logistics of Minnesota's corporate welfare law.145  Most
importantly, it defines what constitutes noncompliance and when
and how noncomplying businesses are to repay the state.45
Furthermore, the law clearly defines a "job" as a full-time job,
and it prorates the penalty for businesses that create a signifi-
cant number of jobs but fail to reach their goals. 47
The HAL also contains job-quality provisions. Although
critics adamantly opposed the job quality provision in
Minnesota's original bill, and the city of St. Paul recently voted
141. Id. § 4(b).
142. Id. § 5.
143. Businesses frequently request state aid precisely because they allege
they are under financial stress. See, e.g., Jill Hodges & David Phelps,
Northwest's Break from Turbulence, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 17, 1995, at
4D (explaining that Northwest approached Minnesota in 1991 under great
financial duress). Although certainly not all businesses seeking such deals are
in financial crisis, it would be impractical to demand growth from those that
are.
144. IIAL § 5(b), Appendix A, infra page 1611.
145. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that the law defines
very few of its most important terms).
146. HAL § 3(b)(iii), (c)(ii), Appendix A, infra page 1611.
147. Id. § 3(b). Businesses that achieve only part of the their goals repay an
amount commensurate with the amount of their shortcoming. Id. Under such
a system, 'the state, in effect, only pays for what it gets. Furthermore,
recognizing partial performance would reduce the possibility of imposing
crippling penalties on smaller businesses and reduce the incentives businesses
would otherwise have to manipulate the system.
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by referendum to reject such a provision for city contracts,148
the HAL embraces job quality as a powerful means of ensuring
expenditures of public money only on projects that truly benefit
the public. 4 9 In the face of strong opposition, 5 ' however,
the IIAL's job-quality provision is more flexible. It does not
require that all new jobs pay a poverty level wage. Rather, the
IIAL requires only that a significant proportion of the new jobs
pay a livable wage.'
Although the HAL is not a perfect accountability statute, it
builds on the foundation that Minnesota and other state's
corporate welfare laws have established. The IIAL, as a
response, provides a framework from which to proceed toward
further accountability.'52
CONCLUSION
Despite serious questions about their effectiveness, business
incentives have become a way of life for most state and local
governments. Traditionally, governmental agencies have handed
out incentives without requiring anything of the recipient
businesses. Recent reports about the astounding quantity and
cost of these incentives have left the public wondering, with so
many other areas in need, just what it is getting for its consider-
able investment.
Minnesota's corporate welfare statute is among the first in
the country that comprehensively seeks accountability. While
148. See supra note 59 (describing the referendum in St. Paul and the debate
which enveloped it).
149. IAL § 3(b), Appendix A, infra page 1611; see also supra note 51
(explaining the scenario that has inspired a push for job-quality requirements
and which still makes them a viable option).
150. See supra note 59 (describing opposition to job-quality provisions).
151. HAL § 3(c), Appendix A, infra page 1611.
152. A new Minnesota bill stands as evidence that accountability remains
a hot topic. On January 25, 1996, the authors of Minnesota's enacted corporate
welfare law introduced into the Minnesota House of Representatives a new bill
which seeks to build on the original law. H.R. 2562, 79th Sess. (Minn. 1996).
Although the new bill does not clarify any of the original law's ambiguities, it
does require that businesses receiving public assistance for economic develop-
ment or job growth "pay every employee hired as a result of the assistance at
least a poverty level wage." Id. § 1(1)(b). The bill demands accountability by
demanding that public money does not sponsor "bad," below poverty level wage
jobs. Although a similar job-quality provision was eliminated from House Bill
869 before it became law in the previous year, the renewed fight for the
provision clearly indicates that support for a job-creation requirement and
support for accountability legislation in general remain strong.
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the statute is far from perfect, it is significant. The Improved
Incentive Accountability Law this Note proposes builds on its
strengths, addresses its weaknesses, and provides an analytical
framework from which to proceed. Accountability is the future.
The HAL will serve as a useful guide to other states as they too
push for accountability and progress toward a system in which
the public can be confident that public money is spent to confer
meaningful public benefit.
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APPENDIX A
IMPROVED INCENTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY LAW
A BILL
Be it Enacted by the Legislature of the State assembled:
SEC. 1. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this chapter are to ensure that businesses
receiving financial assistance contribute positively to the
economic development of the state by (a) creating employment,
(b) maintaining employment, or (c) otherwise promoting
economic development within the state. Those businesses that
do not, as determined by the guidelines set forth in this statute,
will be required to repay the assistance they have received.
SEC. 2. GRANTING GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES
(a) This section applies to state, municipal, or county
governmental agencies granting financial assistance to busi-
nesses for the purpose of economic development or job growth.
For the purposes of this subdivision, "assistance" means grants,
loans, or tax increment financing which, in sum, exceed $25,000
in a fiscal year.
(b) The governmental agency granting the assistance must
be able to demonstrate that the financial value of the projected
benefits of the project exceed the projected costs of this project.
For the purposes of this subdivision, "projected benefits" must be
calculated at their present value and discounted to account for
risk. "Costs" must include the opportunity cost of projects
foregone and the present value of the financial cost of the
assistance.
(c) If the purpose of the assistance is to create job growth,
the granting agency must establish wage-rate and job-creation
requirements to be met by the recipient business within two
years of receiving the assistance.
(d) Each governmental agency must report the wage and job
requirements and the subsequent results for each project in
achieving those requirements to the Department of Trade and
Economic Development. The department shall compile and
publish the results of the reports for the previous calendar year
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by June 1 of each year. The reports of the agencies to the
department and the compilation report of the department shall
be made available to the public.
SEC. 3. BUSINESSES RECEIVING JOB-CREATION
ASSISTANCE
(a) This section applies to businesses that receive financial
assistance if the purpose of the assistance is to promote job
growth. For the purposes of this subdivision, a "business" is a
for-profit corporation, a nonprofit corporation if the ratio of total
compensation of the corporation's chief executive officer to its
lowest paid employee exceeds 25 to 1, a partnership, a limited
liability company, or a sole proprietorship that does not meet the
definition of a small business in section 4 of this chapter.
"Assistance" means grants, loans, or tax increment financing
which, in sum, exceed $25,000 in a fiscal year. "Job" means full-
time, at least 40-hour-per-week employment.
(b) If the recipient business fails to meet 100% of the job-
creation requirement established by the granting governmental
agency as specified in section 2(c) within two years of receiving
assistance, the assistance shall be recaptured or disallowed. The
recipient shall repay the granting governmental agency accord-
ing to the following criteria:
(i) If the recipient fails to achieve at least 50% of the job-
attainment requirement, 100% of the value of the assistance will
be due.
(ii) If the recipient achieves more than 50% of the job-
attainment requirement, the amount due will be prorated
according to the percentage of jobs attained and the percentage
of the shortfall.
(iii) In the case of either subsection (i) or (ii), the amount
due will be considered a loan to which an annual interest rate as
determined periodically by the Department of Trade and
Economic Development will apply. The amount due must be
repaid within two years of the recipient's failure to meet its
goals.
(c) At least 70% of the jobs to be created must pay at least
a "poverty-level wage." For the purposes of this section,
"poverty-level wage" means the hourly wage, including the
employer's share of any health or dental coverage, necessary for
an employee working 40 hours per week, 52 weeks per year, to
earn an annual wage equal to 100% of the federal poverty level
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for a family of four. If 70% of the jobs created at the end of two
years do not pay at least a poverty level wage, the recipient
business shall be required to repay the granting governmental
agency according to the following criteria:
(i) If the recipient business fails to meet 100% of the job-
creation requirement as defined in section 3(c), the amount due
shall be that as defined in section 3(b)(i)-(iii).
(ii) If the recipient business meets the 100% of the job-
creation requirement but fails to pay at least a poverty-level
wage to at least 70% of those jobs, the amount due shall be
equal to two times the difference between the poverty-level wage
and the wage actually paid. The recipient business shall pay
this amount within one year of failing to comply.
SEC. 4. SMALL BUSINESSES RECEIVING JOB CREATION
ASSISTANCE
(a) This section applies to small businesses receiving
financial assistance for economic development or job-creation
purposes. The governmental agency granting the assistance
must establish job creation requirements to be met by the
recipient business within five years of receiving the assistance.
For the purposes of this section, a "small business" is a business
that employs fewer than 20 employees and has a gross annual
revenue of less than $1,000,000.
(b) If the recipient business fails to meet 100% of the job-
creation goal within five years of receiving assistance, the
assistance shall be recaptured or disallowed. The granting
governmental agency shall demand repayment using the criteria
defined in section (3)(b)(i)-(iii) except that the business shall
have five years to repay the amount due.
SEC. 5. ASSISTANCE TO MAINTAIN EMPLOYMENT
(a) This section applies to businesses, as defined in section
3(a), and small businesses, as defined in section 4(a), that
receive financial assistance for the purpose of maintaining
employment in the state. For the purpose of this section,
"assistance" means grants, loans, or tax increment financing
which, in sum, exceed $25,000 in a fiscal year.
(b) The recipient business shall not relocate outside of the
state for 10 years after receiving such assistance or during the
term of a loan or loan guarantee, whichever is longer, unless the
full amount of the assistance and a penalty equal to 10% of the
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total assistance received is paid to the governmental agency
granting the assistance within two years of the relocation.
